The law of motion pictures (1918)

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628 THE LAW OF MOTION PICTURES Section 173. — Actions purporting to be brought under the Copyright Act. Complainants occasionally mistake their remedies. Actions are brought under the Copyright Act where the questions involved have reference solely to contractual relations between the parties. The Federal courts will not entertain such actions, unless the other jurisdictional facts are present.65 plate both remedies; and no reason is suggested why a party who seeks the first should be deprived of the second.” 63 Editorial in X. Y. Law Journal, September 19, 1917. Suits in State Courts affecting Patentable and Literary Rights. The decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Aronson v. Orlov (July, 1917, 116 N. E. 951) is of more than usual interest because of Chief Justice Rugg’s treatment of a defense that is very frequently raised when patentable or copyrightable rights are incidentally, though not direct!}", brought in issue in State courts. It appeared that two of the defendants, former employees of the plaintiffs, associated themselves with a third person in the manufacture of petticoats in accordance with an idea to secure elasticity in connection with the seams originated by one of the plaintiffs and secretly communicated to the defendants in the course of their employment. The plaintiff originator had applied for a patent embodying such idea, but his application had been disallowed. The defendants had applied for a patent involving the same idea and their application had been neither allowed nor disallowed but was still pending. In such condition of the facts an injunction with damages is granted prohibiting the defendants from disclosing and using the plaintiff’s idea for an elastic seam on the ground that it is a protectable trade secret. While there is considerable novelty in this branch of the case, the principal general interest lies in the determination, after discussion, that the subject-matter of the suit is not within the cognizance of the Federal courts,