The memoirs of Will H. Hays (1955)

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FOREIGN RELATIONS 509 ican pictures imported to a certain fraction of the total pictures exhibited. In extreme cases these laws resulted in making American companies practically pay for the production of a foreign nation's own pictures. Government subsidies, which contributed substantially toward the domestic production of pictures in several countries, would strike most Americans, raised on free enterprise, as "unfair competition." Yet they never succeeded in building up a strong industry, because money alone, if tied to regimentation, is powerless to create. Shipment and transportation presented almost insuperable difficulties during World War II. Thousands of films had to be flown to regions which could not be reached quickly in any other way. "Frozen funds," owing primarily to war and exchange, became our last and toughest problem. At one time more than a hundred million dollars, already earned, was withheld. Such problems could be met, if at all, only by joint efforts of producers, distributors, the Association, and the State Department. It was a splendid example of the ability of teamwork to win victories against heavy odds. The policy of our team was to support the American picture position in every practicable way: by making the best possible pictures; by maintaining free trade; by inviting co-operation from every quarter; by keeping well informed on foreign problems of all sorts; by seeking solutions in person, on the basis of mutual advantage; by drawing into the American art industry the talent of other nations in order to make it more truly universal; and, finally, by a confident and resourceful sales policy. The American industry, which had cut its teeth on the toughest kind of competition, had learned that there is no substitute for quality. Abroad, too, it welcomed and stimulated competition, especially along technical and artistic lines. Companies didn't make one set of pictures for home consumption and an inferior brand to ship abroad. In fact, the necessity of making pictures that would sell throughout the world kept prodding our companies to produce good pictures with universal appeal. The pictures that did best here were apt to do best abroad. They were entertainment pictures— fiction on the screen— and essentially free from propaganda. Our natural attitude toward motion pictures logically led us to urge free trade back and forth. I felt very strongly on the matter and, as a Republican, had to take some ribbing on my position. But I found no reason to change my conviction that the screen was the nearest approach to a world language and hence should transcend national barriers. Repeatedly I went to Washington, conferring with the President, the Secretary of State, or members of the Department of Commerce, with the double purpose of keeping films on our own free list and of getting our government's help in surmounting obstacles abroad.