National Archives and Records Service film-vault fire at Suitland, Md. : hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives, Ninety-sixth Congress, first session, June 19 and 21, 1979 (1979)

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48 The first nitrate fire occurred in building C on August 29, 1977. Some 800,000 feet of March of Time outtakes — no edited releases — were lost along with 109 rolls of nil rate aerial film. The aerial film, foi-tunately, had already been copied on safety film. Also fortunately, the compartmentalized system worked and the fire Avas confined to only 1 of the 27 vaults. The ad hoc. committee responsible for investigating the fire concluded that the fire was attributable to a combination of excessive heat in the vaults, due to faulty air-conditioning systems, a spell of hot weather for several weeks, and the presence of some 25,000 feet of deteriorating film. In short, the committee felt conditions favorable to spontaneous combustion of the film were present. As a result of the committee's recommendations, NARS quickly changed its procedure for the disposal of decomposing and copied film, and installed new safety and security procedures, and a daily temperature monitoiing system. New procedures for handling nitrate film were placed in effect, as well as an accelerated film inspection schedule. Two recommendations were not implemented. Because of a lack of sufficient storage space, film could not be removed from temporary storage on tlie floors of the vaults in building C and some is still being stored in this manner. Also, rather than use NARS manpower to administer a test of minimal benefit in providing data on film storage life, it was decided that the manpower could be more effectively used by increasing the rate of conversion and disposal of nitrate film. With these two exceptions, all of the ad hoc committee's recommendations directed at NARS were carried out. The Public Buildings Service — PBS — also moved to implement the committee's recommendations concerned with upgrading of the buildings. A sprinker system was installed in Building C. A sprinkler system paid for by Universal Pictures had been installed in Building A when the collection was accessioned. A contract covering new air-conditioning and air-handling systems, increased insulation, and humidification controls was awarded by PBS in fjanuary 1978. It was during this upgi-ading work that the second fire broke out on December 7, 1978, destroying some 12.6 million feet of Universal newsreel footage in 20 vaults. The ad hoc committee investigating this second fire concluded that: "The fire was most likely caused accidentally as a result of activities associated with upgrading the air-conditioning system." The committee went on to observe that spontaneous ignition of the nitrate film was unlikely "as none of the conditions favorable to spontaneous ignition were present." Specifically, all of the film had been inspected 30 days before the fire and all decomposing film had been removed and temperature readings for the days preceding and including the day of the fire were 55 degrees or below. Perhaps as important as the question of cause is the question of why the fire spread so extensively. Although the sprinklers operated properly, the system of compartmentalization broke down. Rather than being confined to the vault of origin, the fire spread to other vaults.