National Archives and Records Service film-vault fire at Suitland, Md. : hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives, Ninety-sixth Congress, first session, June 19 and 21, 1979 (1979)

Record Details:

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219 red-hot steel chips are not often produced, and they hold their heat only briefly, a red-hot chip falling into a kraft film box could ignite a smouldering fire which could result in a film fire. Photographs made after the fire show burned debris under the drill on the top step of the stool where the drill was left in vault 10 (see photo number 3). The debris, not collected for analysis, may be remains of cardboard heated to ignition by the drill housing during lunchtime. The drill power cord may have been damaged and provided an ignition source for film or cardboard boxes containing film. Smoking, although -strictly prohibited in the vault area, has not been eliminated as a possible cause of the fire. Arson, although possible, is highly unlikely. Three people are known to have been in the fire area prior to the fire: Edward Kocharian, the contractor, and his two employees. Bud Thorn and John McCoy. None had any obvious reason to start a fire deliberately. An outsider, to gain access, would be observable by three separate work groups. The area is completely fenced, with a single unlocked gate, and the location where the fire started is farthest from the gate. As the area is dead-ended, the only traffic in the enclosure is related to film storage, and strangers would have been noticed. No unidentified persons were seen in the area the nnorning of the fire. Other investigators have advanced a theory that the fire was caused by spontaneous ignition of nitrate film. This is unlikely, as none of the conditions favorable to spontaneous ignition were present. Badly deteriorated film can spontaneously ignite at relatively low temperatures (106°F). All film in Building A was visually inspected in late October 19V8, approximately 5 weeks prior to the fire. Filnrx is only unwound when sight inspection reveals signs of deterioration. At that time, about ZO cans of film were found to be in the second stage of deterioration (tackiness) and put aside in vault 3, some distance from the origin of the fire, for priority conversion. Weather conditions were favorable for filnn storage, with temperatures of 55°F and below for 3 weeks prior to the fire. Outdoor temperature at the time of the fire was 55°F (see Appendix A). The 1977 Ad Hoc Committee recomnnended a maximum temperature of 55°F in the film vault.