National Archives and Records Service film-vault fire at Suitland, Md. : hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives, Ninety-sixth Congress, first session, June 19 and 21, 1979 (1979)

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454 Vsi'lt cr*"';t''t?:t"'r" ■!*■ c^ r:r;ic c?'tr"' ■'r ncct^r.n tcrrsrctv? ."::! htjr.'idlT;.' desicn critoric end reducirc hect iced. Present veuU construction r.aices it prQcticaTly inpossiMe to control h'j.midity. V.'ith r.o vapor barrier on the exterior of the building, the block construction will allow moisture to enter the vaults. Lack of thermal insulation on masonry walls provides needless heat gain. Lack of insulation of vault doors and corridor walls produces additional head load, and causes condensation to form in the hall to the extent that the floor must be mopped. The existing explosion vents in each vault, are properly sized, but represent a principle source of heat gain. In fact, the infiltration around the blowout section makes humidity control impractical. By sealing these explosion vents, hov/ever, almost all air exchange would stop which v/ould result in no decomposition gas removal. A cummulation of these gases represents an exolosion hazard. Also, GSA Accident and Fire Protection Officials consider NFPA standards minimal in allowing the absence of decomposition venting if explosion vents exist. Processing room ventilation is presently being handled by a 12 inch wall mounted exhaust fan, with an estimated capacity of 800 cfm. This fan is connected to the electric circuit v/hich also operates the existing a'irconditioning systen and as such is subject to seasonal operation. This is unacceptable considering the toxic vapors and volatile nature of nitrate 5 film. The use of laboratory type fume hoods, as recommended in the September 22, 1971, memorandum, is considered the most proper way of removing released gases. Because of the nature of nitrate film they would have to be rated explosion proof," as v/ould any electrically operated device in the room. With a capture velocity of 100 feet per minute at the hood intake, there would be nearly 800 cfm of air leaving the room for every hood in the room. For the three work stations in the processing room, this would require a make-up of 2400 cfm. Although this represents a considerable heat gain, a package airconditioner could handle this if conditioned make up air is required. However, the possibility of introducing unconditioned outside air directly into the hoods should also be considered. I Humidity control in the processing room, with an air exchange of 2400 cfm would be extremely difficult. KFPA recommends that rewind tables be placed •'in private rooms. , The office area or an unused vault would be suitable for relocating the rev/ind table. Although Vault Buildings A and C do not have motorized rewind tables, they may be installed at a later date. • Other means for reducing machine static electricity exist besides humi'dity control.