Petition for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and brief in support thereof (1916)

Record Details:

Something wrong or inaccurate about this page? Let us Know!

Thanks for helping us continually improve the quality of the Lantern search engine for all of our users! We have millions of scanned pages, so user reports are incredibly helpful for us to identify places where we can improve and update the metadata.

Please describe the issue below, and click "Submit" to send your comments to our team! If you'd prefer, you can also send us an email to mhdl@commarts.wisc.edu with your comments.




We use Optical Character Recognition (OCR) during our scanning and processing workflow to make the content of each page searchable. You can view the automatically generated text below as well as copy and paste individual pieces of text to quote in your own work.

Text recognition is never 100% accurate. Many parts of the scanned page may not be reflected in the OCR text output, including: images, page layout, certain fonts or handwriting.

27 III. The purchaser of tho machine was apprised by the license plate attached to the machine that he could not lawfully use it (1) save with motion picture film leased by a licensee of petitioner and (2) "upon other terms to be fixed" by the petitioner "and complied with by the user while it is IV. The first condition relating to the use of the machine only in connection with film obtained from specially designated parties has been decided by the Court of Appeals to be a condition violative of the Clayton Act and, therefore, void and unenforcible. Petitioner, however, denies that this is so, and contends that such condition is lawful and enforcible under the decision of this Cour-t in Henry vs. Dick, 224 U. S., 1, and that the Clayton Act is inapplicable, because the petitioner is not "engaged in commerce," within the meaning of the Act, but is a mere holding company whose sole property, patents, is of an incorporeal, intangible nature (De La Verne Machine Co. vs. Featherstone, 147 U. S., 209-222) and not susceptible of being made the subject of commerce, within the meaning of the Act, or of the Constitutional provision of which the Act is predicated. V. The second condition, however, relating to the right of the purchaser to use the patented machine only upon compliance with "other terms to be fixed" by petitioner, is not contended, by any one, to be violative of the Clayton Act and depends for its validity upon its intrinsic merits. It is not denied that the name plate and the matter inscribed upon it — still on the machine —