Radio age research, manufacturing, communications, broadcasting, television (1941)

Record Details:

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Planning Industrial Mobilization Research, Development and Adequate Production of the Millions of Items Essential for National Defense Represent the Challenge which Faces American Industry, Foster Says. INDUSTRIAL Mobilization Plan- ning can be defined as the joint eflFort of industry and Government to insure the best utilization of our industrial might. It is indispen- sable for the assurance of adequate national strength to preserve our national security. Our experience in the two world wars has proved the vital necessity of such planning. On each occasion, we were given two years of grace in which to tool up for war — an opportunity we most likely will never again be per- mitted — while our allies took the brunt of the initial attack. Even then, it took us many months to develop the support required for a successful war effort. In the mean- time, the enemy made sweeping ad- vances over territory which it took us years to regain — at unconscion- able cost, in terms both of resources and lives. It is just as important to avoid "too little too late" in terms of industrial support as it is in terms of fighting forces. Although our fighting forces should be maintained in sufficient strength to preclude any sane thoughts of military action against us, it is axiomatic that our national economy cannot and should not be expected, in peacetime, to support the fighting potential required in time of war. It is, likewise, axio- matic that we cannot expect indus- trial facilities, geared to the pro- duction of goods for the peacetime economy, to be converted overnight to the production of enormous quan- tities of munition of war. Never- theless, if costly lessons of the past are to be heeded, we are faced with the stark necessity of curtailing to the irreducible minimum the time required for such conversion. Facilities and equipment must be available, and harnessed, ready to go, to produce items not now manu- factured at all or in insufficient quantities. The best technical know- how must be developed, in the most efficient manner and in the mini- mum of time, to produce predeter- By Admiral Edwin D. Foster Director, Mobilization Planning Departtnent, RCA Victor Division. mined quantities of these muni- tions. And specific plants must be assigned the responsibility for specific wartime production, and equipped with precise knowledge of conversion requirements. These are the prime military objectives of In- dustrial Mobilization Planning. Must Support Civilian Economy At the same time, provision must be made for the continued support of our civilian economy, since with- out this support, no military effort can be sustained. It is the job and the duty of both Government and industry to work together to pre- serve an optimum balance between these dual objectives. Basic to all of this effort is deter- mination of requirements. Require- ments can be determined only if we have a plan of operations. Our de- fense plans, of course, are made by our Joint Chiefs of Staff to meet the requirements of the interna- tional situation, as evaluated by the National Security Council. The character of this whole pro- gram—including the basic and sup- porting plans, and the requirements that stem from these—is one of constant change and adjustment. On the one hand, the basic opera- tional plan must be geared to changes in the international situa- tion. On the other hand, techno- logical progress has added and is still adding further complexity to the solution of our logistical prob- lems. It was not so many years ago that armies subsisted on their bellies; that navies could replen- ish their supplies at almost any port of call, if necessary by plun- der; and that air forces were un- heard of. Technological evolution has changed all of this. Our fight- ing machine has now become a me- chanical and electronics colossus with a seemingly insatiable appe- tite, requiring a constant stream of an unbelievable number of supplies, flowing from all parts of our coun- try, and in many instances from remote parts of the world. Millions of Items Involved The magnitude of the problem is indicated by the number of items required. The Navy alone requires almost three million items. The Army and Air Force require other items peculiar to their needs, which likely add a couple of million more. It is not enough that most of these items be ready for use when and where required. It is mandatory that all of them be available. Con- sider the helplessness of the most modern fleet, completely manned with the finest and best trained per- sonnel and thoroughly equipped in every respect, except that the ships have no rudder mechanisms—or that of an Air Force lacking spark plugs. The development of our fighting machine into an infinitely complex structure has been paralleled by the rise in importance of speed in put- ting our fighting machine into op- eration. The pace has been accel- [6 RADIO AGE]