United States of America v. Motion Picture Patents Company and others (1914)

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tions contained in them were arrived at by agreement of all the manufacturers, as alleged in the petition, is strong evidence that the restrictions were not normal and legal conditions affixed to the use of patented articles. In the Dick case Mr. Justice Lurton said (224 IT. S., at p. 26): " Where, then, is the line between a lawful and an unlawful qualification upon the use? " If a patentee in the ordinary course of business affixes a condition to the use of his patented machine, the fact that he affixes it on his own motion and by independent action is evidence of the fact that he does it in the ordinary course of business. On the other hand, when all the manufacturers engaged in a certain line of business, some of them owning patents and others of them owning no patents, by arrangements and conferences among themselves decide the terms and conditions that the so-called licenses shall contain, we have the strongest possible evidence that the agreements are not normal and usual licenses given by the owner of a patent, but are, in fact, agreements entered into for the purpose of accomplishing restraint of trade. The conferences and the simultaneous execution of all the license agreements on December 18, 1908, prove not only the combination between the defendants, but they establish also that each restriction was entered into in an abnormal and unreasonable manner and therefore is not a lawful qualification upon the use of the article.