United States of America v. Motion Picture Patents Company and others (1914)

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26 Of course, when we come to consider combinations in restraint of interstate commerce, the power of Congress to declare such combinations unlawful is derived from the commerce clause of the Constitution. The source of power is different from the source in the case of the State, but the exercise of the power in each case arrives at the same result, i. e., prohibition of restraints of trade or monopolies. Under the Patterson decision, the distribution of patented articles in intrastate commerce is subject to the police power of the State. In the same way the distribution of patented articles in interstate commerce is subject o the regulations of^oe»£s by virtue of the commerce clause. [Mr. Moon's brief at the bottom of p. 86 inaccurately states that we attempt to interpret the Sherman Act as an exercise of police power, and it makes the same mistake in considering the argument made for the Government in TJ. S. v. Stand. San. Mf. Co.] VII. The fact that defendants leased films instead of selling them constitutes no defense — the form is immaterial. The moment that a patented article enters interstate commerce it becomes subject to the rules of commerce applicable to restraint of trade the same as any other commodity. Any combination which unreasonably interferes with the free flow of commerce is a violation of the Sherman Act, regardless of the form that may be employed in any particular