Report on blacklisting: II. Radio-television ([1956])

Record Details:

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"Is every Communist a potential spy or saboteur? Is every student of Marx a danger to the security of the country? Is every member of an organi- zation which includes Communists to be distrusted? How should the internal enemy be identified? By oath? By his reading habits? By views which are shared by Communists? By his associations? "The answers to these questions are not easy. The Federal Bureau of Investigation collects all information which might possibly be relevant to the appraisal of individual cases. Since government investigators are asking questions about membership in all kinds of organizations, about political views and opinions on various social problems, about interests and reading matter and other items of the kind, the impression has been created that to credit somebody with an active organizational life, with unorthodox or even only outspoken views on public affairs, with extensive reading habits, and so forth, is a disservice to him. The thought naturally arises that if such things are asked about, in the eyes of the government they must be questionable. There is only a brief step from feeling that it is not wise to describe one's friends in this way, to the conclusion that it is not wise to have such activities to one's own credit. "A variety of self-appointed individuals and groups have taken the next step in the process. Though having no official connection with the machinery through which national security is protected, and perhaps not always moti- vated by a concern for national security, they publicly call attention to the records of individuals who deviate from their standards of acceptable behavior. What they emphasize is quite similar to the areas checked upon by official investigators; the important difference is that, whereas the official investigations are confidential, the unofficial ones are broadcast as widely as possible. Such publicity makes the pressure to conform, of course, much stronger. One is in constant danger of public exposure as an individual associated with activities about which questions are asked. "The final increment is supplied by employers. Advertisers, businessmen, school authorities, movie producers, all hesitate to hire or retain employees thus singled out, since this may offend some client, customer, or patron." Thus, the original idea of protecting the national security by collect- ing circumstantial evidence in many directions, to be appraised in toto and in conjunction with other data in order to see whether all evidence converges to justifying strong suspicion, has given way to regarding a few items of information, and often only one, as proof of an employee's undesirability in an organization which may have no possible connec- tion with matters affecting national security. The other consequence of current governmental procedures is that outside the government the motivation behind these procedures has 223