Sponsor (Jan-June 1954)

Broadcasters are ashamed to admit il now but some of them were afraid of a depression, or were waiting for main of the new stations to fold. Dire predictions of impending failures for hundreds of new stations (or old ones unable to meet the challenge) were frequent. Then there were fears of new technical developments — even before these developments matured into full-scale competition. Some of them, like facsimile and fm, never did. Tv eventually did. of course, but broadcasters emphasize that video acted as a brake on rising radio rates even before it became a commercial fact. When the prophetic voice of RCA's David Sarnoff advised NBC's affiliates in 1947 that now was the time to get into tv, it seemed to some that the knell of doom had indeed struck for radio. Some of the factors acting as a deterrent to increased radio rates are not easily definable. A rep executive with long experience in the radio business told sponsor: "Take the case of a good-sized market with a dominant newspaper which owns a dominant radio station. The market has the usual complement of network stations plus one or two independents. Naturally, the newspaper is the chief consideration of the publisher. It grosses more than the station, has a more impressive tradition and has greater meaning in his life. "Being dominant, the newspaper-owned station sets the rate pattern in the market. But its rates may have been held back because it was doing well anyway, because the ad department of the newspaper so requested, and for other such reasons. The other stations obviously find it hard to raise rates if the dominant station keeps rates pegged at the same level. ''This situation, though not too widespread, was a factor in helping keep rates down after the war." One analyst long familiar with radio told a sponsor editor: "I find an inferiority complex among radio people. It may have something to do with the backgrounds of station managers. Or maybe radio people don't consider themselves as big business. Or maybe it's because they don't have that long continuity of tradition that newspapers have." The sum of all these factors appears to have dulled radio's selling and promotion in the crucial postwar years. Radio was hampered by the lack of network unity as well as station unity. The webs and stations sold themselves, but thev didn't sell radio. There was nothing to compare with the general media presentations put out by newspapers and magazines. This situation is being remedied by the growing aggressiveness of such groups as BAB and SRA. But there is still fertile ground to plough and there is still much that individual stations can do. One medium-sized Pennsylvania agency complained to sponsor that it has been almost begging for a genuine radio presentation for almost a year. And it still hasn't gotten one. As an example of weak promotion and selling, broadcasters pinpoint this fact: Radio was slow to capitalize on the discovery that, even before tv, listening in and outside the home was spreading out. There were plenty of secondary bedroom and kitchen sets in the late 40's (as sponsor. probably the first to do so, persistently pointed out during that time). And when America's increasingly prosperous family bought an automobile after the war. nine times out of 10 it bought a radio with it. Radio knew, in a rough way, whal was happening. Bui it told its advertiser with a generous wave ol the hand thai secondary and auto set were jusl velvet, Qiey'ri gratis, no charge. Actually, radio didn't know much aboul listening on these "bonus" sets. \lin all. if radio wasn'l charging for them, whj should it paj to measure them, or be concerned how the) wen measured':' \ml so radio's chance for a higher rate base wenl down the drain. When the rale cuts did come, saj the i idiomen, the) were thus cut from a level that had been too low in the pre-tv era to start with. In evaluating rates toda\ one of radio's strong arguments is that it can reach the consumer more cheapl) than any other major medium. While comparing media < osts can lead to treacherous mathematical shoals, the advertise] who wants or needs such a comparison will usuall) be told by his researchers that radio will deliver his message at a rock bottom cost-per-1,000. A research executive at one of the top 10 agencies told sponsor: "There is no question in my mind that, among the major media, radio is still the cheapest \va\ to reach people." A media analyst at another top 10 agency said: "In terms of a good workhorse medium, able to reach people at low cost, radio has always been a good bu\ . I don't think there's any dispute about that." While the agencies, (Please turn to page 122 I EDITORIAL W H Y A R E RADIO UA 7 E S L 0 W .' How much should an ad mi ilium chargi .' That's a question thai won't find a ready answer at even the largest ad agencies, for the value of one medium vs. anolhi r is immeasurable. That radio is considered the "cheapest" of the major ad m< din is both a compliment and an insult. A complimt nt because it represents a bargain bun: an insult because radio rate levels have been too long based on sloppy selling, soft business tactics, and fears. In tin article <>n these pages sponsor uncovers the cycles and triads that havi combined over llu past 1.") years to depress radio rates. The study is useful falsi n rat reasons : (1) It explains factually mini radio, generally speaking is a bargain bail for tin advertiser; (2) it gives n litlli -known history of radio rating philosophy. To every sponsor and his ag we say. Read tliis one carefully. 8 FEBRUARY 1954 31