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in. There has never been an instance of a theatre being obliged to close its doors for want of film so far as the evidence discloses. And the rentals charged by the various exchanges to the exhibitors have been fair and reasonable, or at any rate have been arrived at solely by bargaining between the individual distributor and his customer and not as the result of any pre-arrangement among those controlling the product.
In Weidman v. Shragge, 46 S.C.R. 1, which was of course a civil action and not a criminal prosecution, the supply of junk in Western Canada was practically controlled by the two parties to the agreement in question, and their arrangement enabled them to stifle all competition.
In Rex v. Elliott (1905) 9 O.L.R. 648, the object and effect of the association in question was to restrict and confine the sale of coal by retail to its own members and to prevent anyone else from obtaining it.
In Rex v. Singer et al (1930) O.R. 202, it was found that facilities for supplying or dealing in plumbing and heating supplies were limited and controlled by the combine there in question, that a common price was fixed and that prices to the public were generally enhanced.
So too it was found in the case already referred to of Rex v. Alexander, that the object and effect of the arrangement between the defendants as to tenders was to limit and prevent competition and practically to dictate to the owner and without his
knowledge who was to do the work for him for which tenders were called and at what prices.
But the facts in all those cases were quite different from the present.
The substance of Mr. Greer’s very able argument is found in the first particulars filed. Shortly the position taken by him is this. He does not say that the individual distributors charged were not trying to sell film, nor does he contend that al] group buying such as was done by Famous Players for its hundred and more theatres 1s contrary to the criminal law, but he contends that Famous Players through its control of so many theatres was able to create and did create an unfair situation favourable to itself and disadvantagous to all others in imposing terms as to protection unfair to its rivals in that those terms prevented them from getting films as soon as they otherwise might; in getting better terms by pur
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