To prohibit and to prevent the trade practices known as "compulsory block-booking" and "blind selling" of motion-picture films in interstate and foreign commerce (1939)

Ig TRADE PRACTICES IN MOTION-PICTURE INDUSTRY conspicuously true of due-process cases that constitutionality is conditioned upon underlying facts and that there is a presumption of constitutionality which "must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute" (0' Gorman and Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 282 U. S. 251, at 257, 1931). The question whether the proposed legislation meets the requirement of due process of law is primarily (but, of course, not exclusively) a legislative one.37 The essence of that requirement is "that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained" {Nebbia v. New York, supra; R. R. Retirement Board v. Alton R. R. Co., 295 U. S. 330, 1935). Upon Congress rests the responsibility of determining whether the ends sought are desirable in the public interest and whether the means employed tend to achieve those ends. It has a large degree of discretion in weighing conflicting interests and in determining which shall prevail. Whatever "deprivation" of property may come from the proposed law must be considered in the light of the reasons which call it forth. Substantial "deprivations" have been sustained; for example, Walls v. Midland Carbon Co. (254 U. S. 300, 1920) (prohibition of consumption of natural gas without utilization of heat) ; Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. (272 U. S. 365, 1926) (zoning laws) ; Miller v. Schoene (276 U. S. 272, 1928) (apple-growing industry preferred over growers of cedar trees). A major objective of this bill is to forestall monopoly. Compulsory blockbooking and blind selling, as complementary practices in the marketing of motionpicture films, are both declared in section 1 to tend toward the stifling of competition. Sections 3 and 4, in turn, are complementary provisions aimed at those practices. That is to say, the former section is designed to enable the exhibitor to choose freely between films and the latter to supply him with information on which to make an informed choice. The power of Congress to foster competition and prevent monopoly in interstate commerce is well established. Compare the Sherman Antitrust Act, the Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act. Moreover, exclusive dealing arrangements have been specifically recognized to have monopolistic tendencies (Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U. S. 346, 1922) regardless of whether they take the form of express contracts or whether they must be inferred from the nature of the business (United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United States, 258 U. S. 451, 1922; Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Co., 243 U. S. 503, 1917). The prohibition (in subdivision 2 of sec. 3) of interstate shipment of any film leased in violation of the provision against compulsory block-booking is designed as an additional means of compelling observance of the main regulation. That Congress has a wide discretion with respect to the means by which its powers are to be carried into execution has been settled law since McCulloch v. Maryland (4 Wheat. 316, 1819). 38 Prohibitions of shipment in interstate commerce are numerous — for example, Hippolite Egg Co. v. United States (220 U. S. 54, 1911 (foods and drugs) ; Brooks v. United States, 267 U. S. 432, 1923 (stolen automobiles); and Champion v. Ames, 188 U. S. 321, 1903 (lottery tickets)). The synopsis requirement of section 4, in addition to being sustainable as part of the plan to prevent monopoly, has further grounds for support. Moral considerations are involved. The synopsis requirement is intended to sharpen the producer's attention to the moral tone of his films and to put the exhibitor and the community he serves in a position to avoid undesirable pictures. Of the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce for the protection of the public morals there can be no doubt (Champion v. Ames, supra; Hoke v. United States, 227 U. S. 308, 1913). Indeed, it is within the discretion of Congress to exert a closer and more exacting control over the movements of films in interstate commerce than is asserted in the pending bill. Control can be carried to the point of prohibition (Weber v. Freed, 239 U. S. 325, 1915) (sustaining the prohibition of interstate movement of prize-fight films).39 But it is to be ob 37 The findings of Congress will be accorded great weight in the courts (Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U. S. 1, 1923). 33 Following *he pattern of the antitrust acts, the bill employs double means of enforcement, namely, proceedings in equity to enjoin violations and criminal proceedings to punish violations. No objection has been made, and there appears to be no basis for any, that the bill lacks sufficient definiteness for purposes of criminal proceedings. Compare Nash v. United States (229 IT. S. 373, 1911); Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas (212 U. S. 86, 1909); Omaechcvaria v. Idaho (246 U. S. 343, 1918). 39 Sec. 396 of title 18, U. S. C. A., prohibits the interstate shipment of "any obscene, lewd, or lascivious, or anv filthy * * * motion-picture films." It was sustained in Clark v. United States (211 F. 916, N. D. 1915).